

# Seeing the Unseen: Entropy-Guided Insights into Binary Files with GView

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## Abstract

The number of known malicious samples has increased exponentially in the last decade, making it more complicated for a security researcher to identify and cluster them quickly. While for most scenarios, most data viewers relate to the file type (either binary or textual) to extract meaningful data, the protective measurements of different malicious payloads may make this task difficult.

Our research introduces an approach that develops an enhanced visualization mode within the open-source framework GView to address this challenge. It harnesses established entropy-based analytical principles to facilitate the identification of anomalies and intrinsic properties in binary data, irrespective of specific file formats.

## Keywords

GView, Cybersecurity, entropy, visualization mode, binary file format, malware analysis, stenography, static analysis, automatic reasoning, scientific visualization, image processing

## ACM Reference Format:

Andrada-Livia Antoneac, Gheorghită Mutu, and Dragoș-Teodor Gavriliuț. 2025. Seeing the Unseen: Entropy-Guided Insights into Binary Files with GView. In *Proceedings of 12th ACM Celebration of Women in Computing: womENCourage™ (womENCourage)*. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn>

## 1 Introduction

Security vendors have multiple approaches to win the ever-lasting battle against malware writers. The real challenge lies in this industry's focus on forensic investigations and security research, specifically in the areas of static analysis and dynamic analysis.

The effectiveness of static analysis over files relies on the capability of one tool to extract and correlate multiple information specific to that file's format. Although all analysis methods have inherent limitations, static analysis, in particular, can prove to be both time-consuming and frustrating. Attackers may conceal malicious payloads with encryption and packing methods. In such cases, entropy becomes a powerful tool for detecting these obscured threats.

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## 2 Related Work

The potential power of entropy and byte frequency, while used in static analysis, is brought up by Gregory Conti et al. [2], presenting the impact of file format, semantics, and structure analysis in contrast with only text-based one.

Later, a similar approach comes from Ming Xu et al. [17] analyzing the file's visual representation. The survey conducted by M. Wagner et al. [16] surfaces the utility of entropy in classification and detection. Another type of entropy representation is detailed in [5] utilizing entropy graphs and the similarity criterion.

Exploiting visual representations in static analysis is extended to opcodes by Hashemi and Hamzeh [6]. Notable papers on entropy used as straight classification or artificial intelligence models come from Hamad Naeem et al. [8], Otsubo et al. [10], Hui Guo et al. [4], Zainodin et al. [20]. Deep learning classification over malware visualization is depicted in Anson Pinheiro's approach [11].

## 3 Problem Description

Many analysis approaches imply classifying a sample based on static [4] [20] or dynamically [15] [12] extracted features, while being continuously accompanied by adversarial attacks [7]. Even though solutions involving automatic detection exist, scenarios often arise where an analyst needs to provide a quick verdict.

Threat actors might rely on packers to avoid sample detection. These cases were thoroughly researched [9] [3] [13]. Although high overall entropy may prevent direct anomaly detection, this characteristic alone promptly guides the analysis toward unpacking within seconds.

An entropy-based view enables rapid identification of anomalous zones or patterns in a sample, regardless of its binary format. Without such visual cues, static analysis slows down—an especially critical drawback in zero-day scenarios.

## 4 Solution

We propose a visualization plugin that we are currently developing inside a specialized framework, GView [18] [19]. The framework is based, at its core, on an extensible Text-User-Interface (TUI) library called AppCUI<sup>1</sup> that ensures our tool works cross-platform (Windows, Linux, MacOS).

With its ability to provide guided analysis for various file types, automatic artifact recognition, extraction, coherent correlation and inference, and meaningful and intuitive views at multiple granularities, GView seeks to explore potential malicious objects.

Inside GView, we name this plugin Entropy Visualizer. It is a generic plugin, meaning it is suitable for any input file or buffer

<sup>1</sup><https://github.com/gdt05079/AppCUI>

object. As the framework supports opening multiple objects, a researcher can visualize the buffer exposed in multiple visualization modes.

Shannon entropy [14](the mathematical foundation of this solution) of a discrete random variable  $X$  is calculated using the formula:

$$H(X) = - \sum_i p(x_i) \log_2 p(x_i)$$

Where  $H(X)$  is the entropy of the random variable  $X$ ,  $p(x_i)$  is the probability of outcome  $x_i$ ,  $\log_2$  is the base-2 logarithm. Its reasoning and context are briefly described in this article [1]. In our case - applying this formula over byte blocks, a byte has values between 0 and 255. Based on this, Shannon entropy values range from 0 to 8.

We can split this range into three intervals: 0 to 6 - the area is likely to contain plain text/data; 6 to  $(8-\epsilon)$  - the area is likely to contain binary data;  $(8-\epsilon)$  to 8 - the area will likely contain encrypted data.  $\epsilon$ , is an estimated difference between absolute chaos (8) and actual entropy, differentiating binary from encrypted data. The file will be represented by blocks of different colors corresponding either to a certain entropy value or one of the defined intervals, resulting in two visualizer methods.

The Rényi entropy [1] and the Tsallis (information) entropy [1] are also included in the visualizer.

## 4.1 Results

From our tests, we identified several cases where computing the entropy on raw or augmented data or correlating both resulted in the following outcomes:

- (1) identifying a malicious MZPE file embedded into a PNG file: On VirusTotal<sup>2</sup>, the PNG is detected only by 12/58 vendors. At the same time, the embedded one has 44/71 detections, showing significant difficulty in dealing with this kind of attack.
- (2) identifying a malicious PHP script embedded into a JFIF file: "Special Strings" are automatically recognized in the visualizer. These are anomalies in a JFIF file, which should contain only metadata and content according to its purpose.
- (3) identifying a tampered executable sample (malicious payload added): for multiple files like <sup>3 4</sup> we have seen a change in the entropy (very high) values at the end of the files.
- (4) identifying samples from the same family (Salinity malware - file infectors): files in the same malware family have similar patterns in terms of entropy values.

## 5 Conclusion

We implemented several types of entropies and techniques that a security researcher can use to filter or pinpoint an anomaly in a sample quickly. They can evaluate a file in seconds based on patterns.

We plan to apply a preprocessing step that unpacks the file before using any algorithm. After any preprocessing steps, we can develop a flag extraction or hash computation method. The first one can be

<sup>2</sup><https://www.virustotal.com>

<sup>3</sup>VirusTotal report for sample #4

<sup>4</sup>VirusTotal report for sample #5

used as input for convolutional neural networks, which aim to use both methods for malware detection.

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